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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in granting a motion for 
summary judgment for specific performance of a real estate 
contract when the only evidence submitted revealed an accord and 
satisfaction of that contract? 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Proceedings. The decision from which 
this appeal is taken arose in the course of a condemnation action 
filed by Deseret Generation and Transmission Cooperative, a Utah 
corporation (MDeseretM). The condemnation affected property in 
Duchesne County being purchased by appellants Clark Jenkins, 
Ferron Elder, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, and J. McRay 
Johnson (the "Jenkins group") from respondents Arvin Bellon, 
Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, Louis B. Dastrup and A. 
Labrum & Sons, Inc. (the "Labrum group"). In response to the 
condemnation action, the Jenkins group had crossclaimed against 
the Labrum group in December, 1982, seeking rescission of the real 
estate contract and the Labrum group had filed a counter cross-
claim seeking specific performance of that contract. In November 
of 1984, the Labrum group moved for summary judgment on the 
crossclaims. The Jenkins group objected to Respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, asserting that an accord and satisfaction of 
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:he real estate contract had taken place in March of 1983. In 
support of that Objection, the Jenkins group filed an Affidavit by 
Ir. George Diumenti, appellants' former counsel, detailing this 
agreement. On March 19, 1985, Judge Davidson issued a written 
ruling finding for the Labrum group in which he specifically con-
sidered and rejected the Jenkins group accord and satisfaction 
argument. An Order granting Labrum*s Motion for Summary Judgment 
was signed May 22, 1985. 
B. Statement of Facts. On December 31, 1980, the 
Jenkins group entered into a Real Estate Contract to purchase 
certain real property located in Duchesne County from the Labrum 
group for the purpose of developing a residential community. In 
September of 1982, Deseret filed an action condemning a 172.4 foot 
strip through the middle of the property to construct high tension 
electrical transmission towers and lines. Complaint, Record 
(hereinafter MR."), pp. 1-5. On December 10, 1982, the Jenkins 
group answered Deseret's Complaint and crossclaimed against the 
Labrum group for rescission of the December 1980 real estate 
contract. Answer and Crossclaim, R. , pp. 167-177. On January 21, 
1983, the Labrum group filed a counter crossclaim against the 
Jenkins group seeking specific performance of the real estate 
contract between the parties according to its original terms. 
Answer to Crossclaim and Counterclaim, R. pp. 188-206. Both 
groups recognized that the condemnation significantly impaired the 
planned development and that monies would be available from the 
condemnation. 
Representatives from both groups and their attorneys 
(Appellants Thomas C. Mabey, Clark Jenkins, Richard McCarver, 
Ferron Elder, and their counsel, George Diumenti, and Respondents 
Curtis B. Dastrup, Arvin Bellon plus Kay Labrum, Arvin Labrum and 
their counsel, Michael R. Labrum) met March 4, 1983 and agreed to 
a recision of the original Real Estate Contract and to disburse 
condemnation funds, 75% to the Labrum group and 25% to the Jenkins 
group. Affidavit of George Diumenti, R. , pp. 449-451, a copy of 
which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A". See 1f1f 2 and 
3. It was also agreed that the Labrum group would retain the 
money already paid on the contract as well as improvements made on 
the property and that the two groups would jointly market the 
property and resist the condemnation action. 
By this date, Deseret had already deposited $39,075 in 
condemnation proceeds with the Court, pursuant to § 78-34-9, Utah 
Code Annotated. An integral part of the March 4, 1983 accord and 
satisfaction agreement provided that $30,000 of the monies on 
deposit with the Court would be immediately released to the Labrum 
group. This was done via a Stipulation dated March 11, 1983 and 
executed by counsel for both groups. Stipulation, R. , pp. 
275-278, a copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
MB" . 
On November 1, 1984, after disbursal of three-quarters of 
the condemnation funds to the Labrum group pursuant to the 
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above-described accord and satisfaction, the Labrum group moved 
for summary judgment on the Jenkins1 crossclaim and their counter 
crossclaim seeking specific performance of the original real 
estate contract. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Crossclaim and Counter-Crossclaim, R. , p. 379. In opposition to 
this motion, the Jenkins submitted to the Court (February 6, 1985) 
the affidavit of their prior counsel, George Diumenti, setting out 
the existence and terms of the March 4, 1983 agreement. See 
Exhibit "A". The Labrum group submitted no evidence contradicting 
the alleged accord and satisfaction. Judge Davidson specifically 
rejected the defense and granted Labrum1s motion for summary 
judgment on the contract. 
III. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Lower Court erred in granting respondents Summary 
Judgment for specific performance of the real estate contract 
because the evidence before that Court showed the real estate 
contract had been the subject of the described accord and satis-
faction agreement. Although this subsequent agreement was not 
formalized by a written instrument, it was legally binding and the 
parties acted in reliance on it. To allow the Labrum group now to 
ignore this agreement would be grossly unfair to the Jenkins group 
and without legal foundation. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT THE LABRUM 
GROUP SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WAS BEFORE THE COURT A MATERIAL 
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and a 
solid body of case law provide that summary judgment is proper 
only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). As the party 
moved against would be defeated without the opportunity of trial/ 
a court is obligated to scrutinize the pleadings, affidavits and 
other material before it in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the opposing party. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984). Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). 
In the instant case, the Jenkins group submitted the 
affidavit of George Diumenti opposing summary judgment setting out 
in detail the terms of the Accord and Satisfaction between the 
parties. Mr. Diumenti*s Affidavit was made on personal knowledge, 
setting forth fact admissible into evidence and about which he was 
competent to testify. Such an affidavit provokes a genuine issue 
of fact. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). The 
-5-
Labrum group submitted no affidavits in support of their motion 
for summary judgment or in contradiction to Diumenti's affidavit. 
On its face, the Diumenti affidavit raises as material issue of 
fact the existence of accord and satisfaction between the parties. 
Diumenti states in his Affidavit that he believed that 
the accord and satisfaction Mwas totally consummated and binding 
upon all parties." Exhibit "A" 1f5. Diumenti indicates and the 
Record supports the fact that the Stipulation for release of the 
$30,000 of the funds deposited with the Court was to be executed 
as a part of the accord and satisfaction agreement. That Stipula-
tion was in fact executed after, and only after, the Agreement. 
R., pp. 275-278. This Stipulation providing for the release of 
the funds is attached hereto as Exhibit MBM. From the Record it 
is obvious that at a minimum, Diumenti's Affidavit raised as a 
material issue of fact the existence of an enforceable accord and 
satisfaction agreement. Therefore, summary judgment was inappro-
priate as a matter of law. Frisbee, 387, 390. 
In his March 19, 1985 ruling, Judge Davidson curtly 
dismissed the Jenkins group claim of accord and satisfaction as 
follows: 
This defense, however, seems to be 
based upon negotiations for settlement 
which were never formally agreed upon. 
Accord and satisfaction cannot be based 
upon such a foundation. 
-6-
Exhibit "C", p. 3. This statement suggests that Judge Davidson 
believed that the accord and satisfaction agreement between the 
parties needed to be evidenced by a written instrument to be 
binding. This is not true. This court has written: 
There is no requirement that an accord and 
satisfaction must be in writing. The party 
alleging accord and satisfaction as an 
affirmative defense has the burden of prov-
ing its occurrence. We have defined accord 
and satisfaction as 'a method of discharging 
a contract/ or settling a claim arising from 
a contract, by substituting for such con-
tract or claim an agreement for satisfaction 
thereof, and the execution of the substi-
tuted agreement.• 
Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1979) (Footnotes 
omitted). 
This Court has, in the past, upheld oral agreements 
modifying contracts that affect real property. In Utah Mercur 
Gold Min. Co. v. Hirschel Gold Min. Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 
1094 (1943), a case involving an alleged oral agreement for the 
five year extension of a written mining lease, the plaintiffs 
argued that they had done exploration and development work over 
and above that required in the written contract in reliance on 
the oral agreement. This Court held that the plaintiffs1 alle-
gations of part performance were sufficient to avoid demurrer 
on the statute of frauds. Adequate part performance was 
defined as any act which places the party performing in a 
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position that non-performance by the other party would consti-
tute fraud. Id. at 1096. The lower court in Utah Mercur based 
demurrer on the ground that the pleading of the plaintiff did 
not state sufficient facts. The Supreme Court, however, found 
adequate plaintiff's allegations that it had completed extra 
work beyond that necessary to comply with the written, expired 
Lease. 
In the instant case, the Jenkins group would not have 
agreed to release $30,000 to the Labrums unless the parties had 
worked out a satisfactory plan dealing with the existing real 
estate contract, the future condemnation proceedings and the 
property. As demurrer was inappropriate in Utah Mercur, 
summary judgment is inappropriate in the Labrurn-Jenkins 
matter. See also LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26 
Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971) and Woolsey v. Brown, 539 
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975). 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was inappropriate as a matter of law 
as the Jenkins group raised below the existence of an enforce-
able accord and satisfaction agreement between the parties. 
The holding of the lower court must be reversed and the matter 
remanded for proper consideration of the accord and satisfac-
tion agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 
tbr 
day of October, 1985. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Natasha Matkin 
Attorneys for Appellants Jenkins, 







PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John P. Ashton (0134) 
Natasha Matkin (4373) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Third Floor MONY Plaza 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3760 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET GENERATION & 
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERRON ELDER, et al., 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GEORGE DIUMENTI II 
Civil No. 7732 
COME NOW Defendants Ferron Elder, Clark Jenkins, 
Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson, by and 
through their undersigned counsel, and offer the Affidavit of 
George Diumenti II, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" in support 
of their objection to Defendants Arvin L. Bellon, A. Labrum & 
Sons, Inc., Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, and Lanis B. 
Dastrup's Motion for Summary Judgment on Crossclaim and 
Counter-Crossclaim and as promised in Defendant's Response to 
Cross-Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Cross-Defendantfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this Q *' day of February, 
1985. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
i 
Huio4^- a JJL fe By !\j^'Obl^' I 
Natasha Matkin 
Attorneys for Defendants Elder, 
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and 
Johnson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this I r^ day of February, 1985, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of George Diumenti II to the 
following: 
Robert F. Orton 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael R. Labrum 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
1«V® §1300. . .„ . ytab 
e 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) s s . 
Comes now George S. Diumenti I I , and be ing f i r s t duly sworn 
upon h i s o a t h , deposes and says as fo l l ows : 
1. Affiant i s an a t t o rney , l i c e n s e d to p r a c t i c e law in the 
S t a t e of Utah and was a c t i n g as counsel on behalf of defendants 
Clark J e n k i n s , R icha rd McCarver , Thomas C. Mabey, J . McRay 
Johnson, and F e r r i n Elder dur ing the months of March and April 
1983. 
2 . A f f i a n t , a t t e n d a n t s e r v i c e s t o t h e a f o r m e n t i o n e d 
i n d i v i d u a l s d id , on t h e 4th day of May, 1983, a t approximately 
11:00 a.m. a t A f f i a n t ' s o f f i c e l o c a t e d a t 505 South Main, 
Bountiful , Utah, meet with Thomas C. Mabey, Clark Jenkins, Richard 
McCarver, F e r r i n Elder, Kay Labrum, Arvin Labrum, Curt is Dastrup, 
Arvin Bellon and Michael R. Labrum, Esq . , r e p r e s e n t i n g Be l lon , 
Labrums and Das t rup . The meet ing was held by mutual agreement 
among t h e p a r t i e s to resolve the various issues a r i s i ng out of: a 
complaint f i l ed in the Fourth Jud i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court in and for 
Duschesne County, S t a t e of Utah, Civi l #7732; a Motion for Order 
of Immediate Occupancy and for Order to Show Cause; an Answer and 
Crossc la im; an Answer to Crossclaim and Counterclaim; a l l a r i s i n g 
out of t h e e f f o r t s of D e s e r e t G e n e r a t i o n and T r a n s m i s s i o n 
Cooperative, a Utah corporat ion, to adjudicate t h e i r r i gh t to have 
a r i g h t - o f - w a y condemned involving ce r t a in r e a l property in which 
the persons present at the March 4, 1983 meeting, and others have 
an in te res t . 
3. The meeting of March 4, 1983, resu l ted in a consumated 
agreement r e so lv ing a l l i s s u e s r a i s e d a t t e n d a n t de fendan ts 
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, and Johnsons' Crossclaim and defendants 
Bellon, Labrums and Dastrup's Counterclaim, which issues arose out 
of a previous contractual relat ionship between the defendants and 
o the r s . The substance of the agreement was: tha t of the sum of 
$39,075 deposited with the Court by the p l a i n t i f f , pursuant to 
Section 78-34-9 U.C.A., was to be distributed 75#, e.g. $30,000, 
to Bellon, Labrums and Dastrup, and 25$, e .g. $9,000 to Elder, 
Jenkins , McCarver, Mabey and Johnson; the December 31, 1980 real 
estate sales contrac t entered into between Bellon, Dastrup and 
Labrums as s e l l e r s and Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson as 
purchasers, was to be rescinded, a l l performances and ob l iga t ions 
a t tendant thereto forgiven, a l l considerations paid to se l le rs to 
be retained by se l le rs as well as any improvements i n s t a l l e d upon 
the p r o p e r t y to be re ta ined by the s e l l e r s ; mutual and jo in t 
prepara t ion and t r i a l of the r ight-of-way condemnation, and a 
d iv i s ion of a l l proceeds in excess of the $39,073 deposit to be 
distributed among the buyers and se l le rs after at torney's fees and 
costs in the same_jpej^c_entages as t he d e p o s i t to the e x t e n t 
required to enable buyers to recover those sums paid pursuant to 
the agreement as well as those sums expended in improvements, and 
the se l le rs recover the contract balance, thereafter equally among 
and between the buyers and s e l l e r s ; the remaining real property 
was to be sold through the mutual e f f o r t s of the buyers and 
s e l l e r s , each devo t ing in t h e i r own areas of exper t i se the 
diligence required to se l l the real property. The proceeds of the 
sa le to be d i s t r i bu t ed between buyers and se l le rs to accomplish 
the scheme and division hereinbefore immediately described. 
A* A st ipulat ion evidencing the part ies agreement concerning 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the deposit was executed on the 11th day of 
March 1983> by counsel for the respective p a r t i e s and the moneys 
d i s t r i b u t e d . At tached h e r e t o and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n and 
i d e n t i f i e d as E x h i b i t A i s a copy of a March 1 1 , 1983 
correspondence from Michael R. Labrum to a f f ian t evidencing the 
t r a n s m i t t a l of the s t i p u l a t i o n and also attached hereto and 
incorporated herein and iden t i f i ed as Exhibit B i s a March 18, 
1983 correspondence from affiant to Michael R. Labrum evidencing 
receipt of the s t i p u l a t i o n and request tha t a short memorandum 
s e t t i n g f o r t h the agreement, which a f f ian t has set for th in 
paragraph 3 hereof be prepared and executed to e l i m i n a t e any 
misunderstanding. 
5* Affiant s ta tes that the foregoing, in his opinion, was and 
represents a t o t a l accord, s a t i s f a c t i o n and r e so lu t ion of the 
i ssues ex i s t i ng between buyers and s e l l e r s , and further s ta tes 
upon h i s information, opinion and b e l i e f t ha t t he mat te r was 
t o t a l l y consumated and binding upon a l l p a r t i e s as a matter of 
fact and law. 
Dated this ^ 2 ^ day of January, 1985-
toi law ^  £eo 
^ ; Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s cQ3 day of January, 
1985-
My Commission Expires: 1-29-87 
Notary Public 
Residing at: Bountiful, Utah 
ICNAIL R LABIUM 
AWCUS TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
108 N O R T H MAIN 
P.O. BOX 724 
RICHFIELD. UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE 896-6484 
AREA CODE 801 
March 11, 1983 
Mr. George Diumenti 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
RE: Deseret vs. Elder et.al. 
Dear George: 
Please find enclosed a Stipulation for disbursal 
of the funds presently on deposit with the Court in the 
above-entitled action. I have heretofore sent out waivers 
of interest to the other Defendants. I would appreciate 
your signing the enclosed Stipulation and returning it at 
your earliest convenience so that we might get the funds 
disbursed. 
The Court also granted us thirty (30) days from 
March 14, 1983, to file briefs opposing Deseret's motion 
to separate the condemnation action from the crossclaim and 
counter crossclaims. The matter would then be submitted to 
the Court upon the briefs without the need for oral argument, 
Should you have any questions, please advise. 
Very truly yours, 
lael R. Labrum 
MRL:dl 
Enclosure 
March 18, 1983 
Mr. Michael R. Labrum 
Attorney at Law 
108 North Main 
PoO. Box 724 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
RE: Deseret v. Elder et al. 
Dear M1ke: 
I am 1n receipt of your correspondence and Stipulation 
of March 11th. In that we have not memorialized 1n writing our 
clients' agreement, I think that we should do so Immediately. 
I'd appreciate your drafting a short memorandum setting forth 
the agreement so that there will be no dispute as to the under-
standing at a later date. 
Sincerely, 
DIUMENTI, HARWARD & NELSON 




MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS: 
Bellons, A. Labrum & Sons, 
& Dastxups 
10 8 NORTH MAIN 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
896-6484 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF '^ TAH 
DESERET GENERATION and 
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FERRON ELDER aka FERRON C. 
ELDER, MARVEL MALNER, aka 
MARVEL L. MALKER, FLYING 
DIAMOND RANCHES, INC., a 
Utah Corp., STEVE NELSON, 
ARVIN L. BELLON, DRY GULCH 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah 
Corp., THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, MOON LAKE WATER 
USERS ASSOC, a Utah Corp., 
STATE OF UTAH acting through 
the UTAH WATER AND POWER 
BOARD, CLARK JENKINS, RICHARD 
McCARVER, THOMAS C. MABEY, 
J. McRAY JOHNSON, MAURINE G. 
BELLON, A LABRUM AND SONS, 
INC., a Utah Corp., B. CURTIS 
DASTRUP and LANIS D. DASTRUP, 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 7732 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW MICHAEL R. LABRUM, attorney for Defendants, 
Arvin 1U, Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, A. Labrum and Sons, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, B. Curtis Dastrup and Lanis D. Dastrup 
and George Diumenti, Attorney for Defendants Ferron Elder, 
Clark Jenkins, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay 
Johnson and hereby stipulate and agree that the proceeds 
heretofore deposited into Court by Plaintiff in order to obtain 
their order of immediate occupancy in the amount of Thirty 
Nine Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($39,075.00) should be 
distributed to these Defendants as follows: 
1. Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) plus any 
accrued interest to Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon. A. 
Labrum and Sons, Inc., a Utah Corporation, B. Curtis Dastrup 
and Lanis D. Dastrup. 
2. Nine Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($9,075.00) 
plus any accrued interest to Ferron Elder, Clark Jenkins, Richard 
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 19 83. 
MICHAEL R. LABRUM 
Attorney for Defendants Bellon, 
Labrum and ^ Dastrup 
GEOAGE\DIUMENT\ V~ 
Atto\rney for Defendants xElder, 
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson 
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FERRON ELDER, et al., 
Defendants. 
i R U L I N G 
i Civil No. 7732 
In this matter, Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay, 
purchasers of certain real property pursuant to a Real Estate Con-
tract, have raised the issue of "frustration of purpose" as a de-
fense against the Sellers, Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup. 
Purchasers seek to terminate the contract and are seeking a refund 
of monies paid, through that defense. They contend that the con-
demnation action will destroy the value of the land. Sellers con-
tend that the condemnation was foreseeable and does not constitute 
a frustration of purpose entitling purchasers to restitution. 
The issues before the Court are whether the defense of frus-
tration of purpose is applicable to this case and if so whether 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
The doctrine of frustration of purpose has been developed by 
the courts in an attempt to determine how the risk of loss of an 
after-occurring condition should be distributed. This doctrine 
differs from impossibility of performance because the performance 
of the contract, the purchase and sale of the land, is still 
possible. Rather, the doctrine is raised when one party claims that 
its subjective purpose for entering into the agreement has been 
frustrated by something occurring after the agreement• 
The requisite elements of the doctrine include a fortuitous 
event supervening to cause a failure of consideration or a des-
truction of the value of the expected purpose• The doctrine re-
quires that the event be fortuitous? unforeseen, not caused by a 
party and not preventable by them. If the elements are present, 
the courts have then applied the doctrine to determine which party 
should bear the risk of loss. See Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 
1282 (1976); Corbin on Contracts Section 1322, 1353, 1354, 1355; 
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sections 401 and 402, 
In this case, the purchasers are claiming that the condemn-
ation proceedings occurring nearly two years after sale constitute 
the fortuitous event which destroys the possibility of this being 
"developable property'1 • This raises several specific questions. 
First, was thepossibility of condemnation reasonably foreseeable 
at the time the contract was made? Second, has the value of the 
expected purpose been destroyed? Third, what purpose was meant 
by the term ''developable property"? The answer to these questions 
shows that the doctrine of frustration of purpose does not apply in 
this case. 
Condemnation proceedings can reasonably be foreseen when making 
real estate contracts and particularly in areas currently in the 
growth economy. That the parties understood that this particular 
property was in such an area is evidenced by the stated purpose. 
Such condemnation could have been for roads, public utilities, 
pipelines or for the powerlines as did occur. That being the 
case, the parties could have included provisions dealing with 
that possibility in the contract. Since the purchasers would be 
the ones effected by such an event they had the duty to protect 
themselves. Their failure to do so causes the risk of loss to be 
placed on. them rather than on the sellers. That such an event was 
foreseeable renders the occurrence non-fortuitous and the doctrine 
does not apply. 
In answering the second question it is equally evident that 
the doctrine has no application. By the very nature of condemnation 
proceedings, the loss resulting from the condemnation will be repaid. 
The duty of the court is to determine what damages, if any, are 
caused by the taking, including severance damages to the property 
not taken. The intended result is to make the party suffering the 
taking economically whole. If such is accomplished, how can the 
value be destroyed? The parties are free to put on such evidence 
as may be desired to establish the value of the property at its 
highest and best use. Presumably, such use will be that for which 
it was purchased. And if persuaded by the evidence, compensation 
will be determined accordingly by the court. Accordingly, in the 
normal case and certainly in this case, the doctrine is inapplicable 
because there is no destruction of value. 
The third question raises factual issue which would be relevant 
if the doctrine applied. However, such questions are irrelevant at 
this time. 
The purchasers have also raised the defense of accord and 
satisfaction. This defense, however, seems to be based upon nego-
tiations Tor settlement which were never executed nor formally 
agreed upon. Accord and satisfaction cannot be based upon such a 
foundation. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by sellers is granted. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: C. Keith Rooker Clark Jenkins 
F. Elgin Ward J. McRae Johnson 
Ferron Elder Robert Orton 
Michael R. Labrum John P. Ashton 
Richard McCarver Gordon A. Madsen 
Thomas Mabey Steven Nelson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this f>^ day of October, 1985, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to the 
following: 
Michael R. Labrum, Esq. 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Robert F. Horton, Esq. 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
